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2 Conﬂict and peace in the making
Colombia from 1948–20101
Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón
Introduction
This chapter discusses the evolution of the Colombian conﬂict and the exis-
tence of peacebuilding initiatives with diﬀerent groups as part of the process
of consolidation of statehood in Colombia since 1948. Both war and attempts
at peace-making in Colombia have coexisted since 1948 (Palacios, 2012).
To understand the coexistence of peace initiatives and the active pursuit of
violence in Colombia, we need to understand the violence beyond the broad
narrative that the Colombian armed conﬂict is essentially a ﬁght between the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo
(FARC—EP)2 and the Colombian state. Various groups with diﬀerent agen-
das overlap in each of the diﬀerent provinces of Colombia, making this
understanding imprecise. Colombia is a country in which diﬀerent armed
groups have exerted violence in the same territory: paramilitaries, Ejército de
Liberación Nacional (ELN)3, Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL)4, Bandas
Criminales (BACRIM)5, Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC)6,
organized armed groups, and drug traﬃckers are some of the labels used to
describe some of the organizations still operating in the country alongside the
FARC—EP dissidents.
Thus broader understanding is necessary to reconsider accounts that depict
the violence which has taken place in Colombia since 1948 as solely FARC—
EP related. Several violent conﬂicts, peace attempts, and agreements have
taken place with other groups in the last ﬁve decades (López Hernández,
2016). Colombia has signed at least nine peace agreements with diﬀerent
groups since the 1980s. This has all taken place while violence was ongoing in
the country (López Hernández, 2016; Palacios, 2012).
Recent scholarship on the Colombian conﬂict presents a more nuanced
description of the violence in Colombia and an understanding of the ‘grey-
scales’ that enable the mix of illicit crops, drug traﬃcking, state weakness,
guerrilla groups, peace processes, peace agreements, and the prevalence of
violence and warlordism to emerge almost simultaneously in the same terri-
tory (Romero, 2003; Duncan, 2006; González González, 2014).
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The emergence of the FARC—EP could be deﬁned as the outcome of the
transformation of a particular self-defence force. In fact, it can be argued that
some of the founding FARC—EP members were victims of the ‘political’
violence in Colombia between 1920 and 1950 (Sánchez Gómez, 1988). In a
way, the FARC—EP is the oﬀspring of the failure by the state to deliver jus-
tice to all their citizens and its incapacity to achieve a monopoly of violence
in the country (Comisión Histórica del Conﬂicto y sus Víctimas, 2015; Cor-
poración Observatorio para la Paz, 2009; Aguilera, 2014). Other authors
argue that the dynamics of violence that co-created the FARC—EP were
actually a continuation of the existing partisan violence before 1948 (Meer-
tens & Sánchez, 1983; Molano, 1994). The birth and the origins of the
FARC—EP are a matter of academic debate; the fourteen diﬀerent accounts
of the origin of the conﬂict in Colombia presented by the historical commis-
sion of the conﬂict of Colombia are proof of this (Comisión Histórica del
Conﬂicto y sus Víctimas, 2015).
The state has sought to end the violence either by negotiation or by mili-
tary defeat both before and after the emergence of the FARC—EP. However,
these attempts to consolidate the power of the state have been obstructed by
some sectors that have beneﬁted from the conﬂict at a national or local level,
thus fuelling the violence. The tension between war and peace is a constant of
modern Colombian history (Palacios, 2003; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014).
This chapter presents a brief summary of the Colombian conﬂict, and of
previous peace processes that took place in the country after 1948. The his-
tory of Colombia and its violence is analysed considering the peace negotia-
tions, peace attempts, military oﬀensives, and the demobilization initiatives that
involved multiple armed groups during the tenure of successive governments in
the country between 1948 and 2010.
This interval can be characterized as comprising two main periods: 1948 to
1991, and 1991 to 2010. The initial period of 1948–1991 can be considered as
that of the emergence of the modern form of violence in Colombia: the
period begins in 1948 with violent initiatives throughout the country follow-
ing the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán and ends with the establishment
of a new political covenant in the 1991 Constitution. The period of 1991 to
2010 can be considered a period of transformation, between the enactment of
the new constitution and the 2012–2016 peace process with FARC—EP (see
Chapter 3). The 1991–2010 period saw multiple peace processes and several
demobilizations. At the same time, counter-responses by armed actors and
local élites against the democratic openings of the 1991 Constitution and the
peace agreements signed in this period were observed.
The emergence of left-wing guerrillas and the 1991 Colombian
Constitution
The emergence of violence in modern Colombia saw its inception in the
period known as ‘La Violencia’ (the violence), a wave of inter-party violence
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between 1948 and 1958 in which almost 2% of the population of the country
was assassinated (Palacios, 2003). This process led to the rise of multiple liberal
guerrilla groups and armed right-wing groups.
The period between the emergence of the guerrillas and the passing of the
1991 Constitution can be understood as having three main phases. Between
1948 and 1964 bipartisan violence transmuted into a rural war and gave rise
to the left-leaning guerrilla movements that are still in existence today. The
period between 1964 and 1982 was marked by the ﬁrst attempt by the state to
defeat the left-wing guerrillas militarily, some overtures towards negotiation
processes which failed, the end of the National Front duopoly, and the Gov-
ernment of Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978–1982) and its counter-insurgency
policy. Finally, the period between 1982 and 1991 is characterized by the
emergence of the state’s ﬁrst oﬃcial attempt to negotiate a peace deal with
FARC—EP and other guerrilla groups: this met with a degree of success
while failing in other respects. The period ended with the drafting of the 1991
Constitution.
From ‘the violence’ to the emergence of a rural war: 1948–1964
As a response to La Violencia, several armed groups (which lacked any cen-
tralized or structured organization) proliferated across the countryside;
against a background of increasingly violent clashes, the ‘pájaros’ (Con-
servatives) and guerrillas (Liberals) emerged as ‘self-defence’ groups (Palacios,
2003). Violence took a stronger partisan line after the election of President
Mariano Ospina Pérez (1946–1950), and was expressed in the recurrence of
pogroms by Conservatives on Liberals and their reprisals, and in calls by
Catholic priests across the country for their congregations to support the
Conservative Party, condoning violence against Liberals from their pulpits,
and in some cases participating actively in that violence. Not only had the
Government sought a political cleansing of their opponents from the state
bureaucracy, but the state also turned a blind eye when violence targeted
Liberals (Meertens & Sánchez, 1983). This practice continued and escalated
during the government of Laureano Gómez (1950–53) whose incendiary
rhetoric brought the country closer to a civil war (Palacios, 2012). The irre-
sponsibility of the Government and its authoritarian actions triggered a
peaceful coup d’état and ushered in a military regime promoted by politicians
from both parties who wanted to stop the civil war (Palacios, 2003).
The assumption of the presidency by Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in June
1953, at the head of a military administration, brought the oﬀer of an
armistice to the liberal guerrillas, and the promise of both peace and the
monopoly of violence within the country. The military regime promised to be
a neutral holder of the monopoly of violence, as other institutions—such as
the police—were seen as biased by signiﬁcant segments of the population.
The promise of peace came in the form of an amnesty that was to be war-
ranted by the military rule, taking place between 1953 and 1958. Indeed, both
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the Pinilla Government, and the military junta that followed (after the coup
d’etat of 1957 that ousted Pinilla) managed to demobilize several of the liberal
guerrilla groups (Meertens & Sánchez, 1983; López Hernández, 2016).
After 1958, a bipartisan duopoly called the National Front (which was to
last until 1974) emerged as a solution to the violence, which both traditional
political parties had employed as a means to achieve political power. Under
the arrangement, both parties were to participate in government alternately.
Violence was greatly reduced under the National Front, but this political
agreement between the Conservatives and the Liberals failed to allow for the
entrance of new political parties into the system, or to guarantee the safety of
citizens beyond the bipartisan violence (Molano, 1994). It also overlooked the
violence to which some of the demobilized liberal guerrillas were subjected,
which led to the belief that the state would not honour agreements and the
promise of peace for former ﬁghters, and that peace would not be warranted
by the state (Meertens & Sánchez, 1983).
In the meantime, the Cold War winds were blowing: the Cuban Revolution
and the fear of the spread of communism across Latin America also inﬂu-
enced Colombian politicians and their fears. It was feared that the remaining
self-defence groups that had not demobilized were liable to become instru-
ments of socialist interests and act as the seeds of a Cuban-style revolution in
Colombia (Pizarro Leongómez, 2011). In the Colombian Congress there was
a strong partisan debate about the prevalence of some groups bearing arms,
and whether and how they constituted a threat for the Colombian state. In
fact Senator Álvaro Gómez claimed at the time that areas such as Marque-
talia (where one of the peasant self-defence forces was located) constituted an
aﬀront to state sovereignty and were in fact ‘independent republics’ (Gutiérrez
García & Marín Suárez, 2013). As a consequence, the Government decided to
act to abort the possibility of a left-wing guerrilla force emerging in the
country. A military campaign unfolded in 1964 to some degree of tactical
success, uprooting existing groups identiﬁed as potential seeds of communist
revolution in Colombia. However, the campaign failed strategically, as it in
fact accelerated the birth of the Marxist guerrilla movement, radicalized other
organizations, and informed a narrative of a repressive state that was not to
be trusted.
From the birth of the guerrilla movements to the end of the security statute:
1964–1982
The late 1960s and the decade which followed were dominated by the military
response of the Colombian Government to the rise of ‘new’ armed groups
and the transformation of old groups; this period also saw the entrance of
new elements that further complicated the Colombian conﬂict: drug traﬃck-
ing and paramilitary forces.
As early as 1965, the government of León Valencia (1962–1966), recogniz-
ing the challenges of controlling the totality of the Colombian territory and
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informed by fears of the spread of communism, issued Decree 3398, which
established a legal framework to support the creation of self-defence groups
that could be armed in order to defend the state against the feared guerrillas
and spread of communism in the country (Meertens & Sánchez, 1983; Pala-
cios, 2012). During this period there were no formal peace oﬀers from or to
any guerrilla groups, and initial attempts to tackle the guerrillas were medi-
ated by military operations. Diﬀerent governments took diﬀerent approaches.
The administration of Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966–1970), for example,
passed Law 48 of 1968, which deﬁned the legal framework for the con-
solidation of self-defence forces, and pursued a military approach to combat-
ing armed groups. The latter policy was continued by the government of
Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970–74), and included military operations such as
Operation Anorí in 1973, in which the ELN was nearly destroyed. The
objective of the state was to reclaim the monopoly of violence in the territory
through force.
Yet, in this period, more armed groups were born: the EPL in 1965 and the
Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19) in 1974 (Palacios, 2012). The EPL was of
Maoist origin and emerged as the radicalization of some members of the
Colombian Communist Party, following debates around the Sino-Soviet split
(Vargas Velásquez, 2000). The M-19 took its name from the date of the
allegedly fraudulent presidential elections of 1970.7
Meanwhile, drug traﬃcking was becoming established within Colombian
society, as the permissive stance of some political leaders allowed for an inﬂux
of money from drug traﬃcking into the economy and political system, and
the legalization of drug lords’ incomes (Pécaut, 2013). During this period
(1974–1982) private self-defence groups (some of them the same self-defence
forces created during the 1960s) merged their hatred of guerrilla groups with
the funding from drug traﬃckers, large landowners, cattle growers and emer-
ald traders—creating the seeds of a future ‘paramilitarism’ in the country
(Gutiérrez Sanín & Barón, 2005).
The governments of the 1960s established a legal framework that allowed
for the emergence of counter-insurgency self-defence forces.8 In contrast, the
1970s brought increased confusion around the legal regulation of these forces.
The absence of the state monopoly of violence, conjoined with the interests of
drug traﬃckers and local élites, allowed for diﬀerent groups to project their
own military force in diﬀerent parts of the country (García-Peña Jaramillo,
2005; Romero & Valencia, 2007). In some respects the Colombian state
turned a blind eye, as the armed forces saw these groups as allies in their ﬁght
against the guerrillas (Ronderos, 2014). The government of Alfonso López
Michelsen (1974–78) made attempts to start peace negotiations with the ELN,
but failed to start a formal process.
President Turbay (1978–1982) was elected toward the end of the decade,
and established the highly repressive ‘security statute’, under which the Gov-
ernment adopted a militarized response to the rise of guerrilla groups. This
response commonly included human right abuses, torture, and disappearances
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across the country (Ramírez Bacca & Marín Arenas, 2015). Interestingly, in
addition to a martial approach, the Turbay Government attempted the start
of a negotiation process with the FARC—EP in 1981; however this process
failed to formalize.
From martial law to peace and the promise of a social covenant: 1982–1991
In 1982 the newly-elected government of Belisario Betancur Cuartas (1982–
1986) led a fresh attempt to build a peace process with the guerrilla forces, but
encountered a series of obstacles related to the growth of paramilitaries and
drug traﬃcking within the country. In facing this challenge, the Betancur
Government adopted a diﬀerent approach to solving the violence in Colom-
bia. During this period, the state considered a new peace process with the
guerrillas. While peace processes were previously understood as processes of
amnesties, or demobilizations, no formal peace negotiations had previously
been undertaken with the left-wing guerrillas. The infrastructure and the
institutions for peace started to be built in this period.
The Government’s ﬁrst attempt at a peace process with the FARC-EP was
expressed in the La Uribe agreements signed in 1984.9 A ceaseﬁre was also
agreed with the EPL, the Movimiento de Autodefensa Obrera (ADO)10 and
the M-19.11 The agreements were weak in their implementation, as the state
lacked either the experience or the capacity to verify, arbitrate, and implement
the agreements. However, they allowed for the emergence of the Union
Patriótica (UP)12 party and the introduction of the political expression of the
FARC—EP’s agenda into mainstream politics. Despite the promise oﬀered by
the agreements, the Government argued that the FARC—EP used the cease-
ﬁre they established to grow militarily. At the same time, the armed forces did not
honour the ceaseﬁre, and members of the UP were massacred in face of the
indiﬀerence of state institutions (Palacios, 2012). Trust was not established,
thus processes were not successful.
In the 1980s the country also found itself ﬁghting not only guerrillas, but
also drug traﬃckers. In 1979 the Turbay Government signed a Treaty of
Extradition with the USA, permitting that country to extradite Colombians
indicted in US courts.13 Following this, increased pressure from the US Govern-
ment, and the ‘war on drugs’ paradigm it pursued, led in turn to greater pressure
being placed on drug cartels by the Colombian Government in the 1980s. This in
turn unleashed a violent response from these groups (Matthiesen, 2000). This
new battlefront for the state was evidenced by the assassination of the Justice
Minister, Lara Bonilla, in 1984, and the perception that the state was besieged by
this violence was highlighted by the 1985 attack by the M-19 guerrillas on the
Palace of Justice in Bogotá (where Colombia’s Supreme Court was based).
The administration of Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986–1990) continued the
eﬀorts for peace, notably with the M-19 group (most of these meetings were
secret, and were not oﬃcial), while the UP gained ground politically, winning
several posts in municipalities and some seats in the Senate and the Congress
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(Cepeda, 2006). In 1988, the M-19 kidnapping of the leader of the Con-
servative Party (the son of former President Gómez) mobilized political sup-
port and public opinion in favour of a peace process. The inclusion of the
Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame (MAQL)14, the EPL, the Partido Revo-
lucionario de Trabajadores de Colombia (PRT)15, the Corriente de Renova-
ción Socialista (CRS—a faction of the ELN)16, and the Comandos Ernesto
Rojas in diﬀerent peace processes contributed to a broader (yet incomplete)
national peace process. This process still failed to include the ELN and the
FARC—EP.
Yet, the signing of these agreements, as well as the peace agreements with
the M-19, signalled the possibility of peace in the 1990s. The electoral cam-
paign for the presidential election in the 1990s reﬂected a state that was trying
to attain peace and change, but was under siege from diﬀerent actors. The
assassination of three presidential candidates (Galán of the Liberal Party,
Jaramillo of the UP, and Pizarro of M-19) showed that instability and con-
tinued conﬂict was desirable for some groups such as paramilitaries, drug
traﬃckers and even some members of the establishment.
The progress towards peace and the creation of an initial institutional fra-
mework for peace during this period culminated in a reform that changed the
outdated constitution of 1886, the 1991 Constitution (Cárdenas et al., 2006;
Banks & Alvarez, 1991; Uprimny, 2003). Facilitated by the peace process, the
1991 Constitution served to provide a framework which allowed, among
other things, the recognition of the rights and entitlements of indigenous and
Afro-descendant communities, the creation of mechanisms for political
participation and the reassertion of a multi-party democracy.
The ‘end of history’: the 1990s, 9/11 and Uribe
Many considered that an encompassing and ambitious constitution would
ﬁnally aﬀord space for a stronger social covenant in Colombia, and while the
FARC—EP and the ELN were not part of the 1991 constitutional assembly
process, the promise of a more open state and the possibility of peace were
tangible. In addition, international developments such as the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the promise of the ‘end of history’ brought dramatic transitions
that could support peace in Colombia (Fukuyama, 1989).
However, hopes for the consolidation of peace in Colombia were countered
by the response of right-wing groups and politicians against the 1991 Con-
stitution; the encroachment of illicit drugs as the fuel for the Colombian
conﬂict, which allowed left-wing armed groups to survive the demise of the
Soviet Union and escalate confrontations;17 and a series of unexpected con-
sequences of democratization in the country, such as the co-optation of poli-
tical posts across the territory by paramilitaries (López Hernández & Ávila
Martínez, 2010; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014).
This period saw two formal attempts to achieve peace with the FARC—EP:
one during the administration of César Gaviria Trujillo (1990–1994), and
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another during that of Andrés Pastrana Arango (1998–2002). Thereafter, the
successive administrations headed by Álvaro Uribe (2002–2006 and 2006–2010)
pursued a military approach towards peace with the guerrillas.
From hope to the emergence of the FARC—EP as an electoral force: 1991–98
Following the signing of the new constitution in 1991, and given that some
groups demobilized successfully, the government decided to increase pressure on
other guerrillas to force them to negotiate. The government therefore attacked
former safe havens of the guerrillas that had not accepted its oﬀers of a peace
process (Corporación Observatorio para la Paz, 2009). However, the eﬀects of
this strategy appeared to be limited.
Whereas the peace processes at the beginning of the 1990s facilitated the
demobilization of several guerrilla groups (notably the M-19, the MAQL, the
CRS and the EPL), the outcomes of these processes were not homogeneous:
the paths of the cadres of these organizations varied after their demobiliza-
tion. The M-19, MAQL, and the CRS cadres followed a largely successful
reinsertion process. In contrast, the EPL and several of its cadres returned to
warfare to feed the ranks of paramilitary groups.
Several elements explain the recidivism of the EPL cadres in comparison
with the other groups who demobilized in the early 1990s. Among these were
the lack of options for demobilized cadres, the weak institutional capacity of
the demobilized groups to undertake initiatives for their cadres, and the
incapacity of the state to provide security for demobilized cadres. In the case
of the EPL the most notable factor was the terror campaign unleashed by the
FARC—EP18 that saw demobilized EPL cadres as either traitors or competi-
tors for the political control of the provinces of Urabá and Córdoba. The
assassination of hundreds of former EPL cadres between 1991 and 1995 by
the FARC—EP (Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 1999)19
pushed former EPL cadres to join other armed groups, and inﬂamed the
violence in these provinces.
As noted, the policy of the Gaviria Government was not solely military; it
also attempted a joint peace process with the ELN and the FARC—EP, with
negotiations taking place in Venezuela and Mexico. The initial approaches
managed to deﬁne a ten-point agenda, and a series of preliminary agreements,
including agreement on mechanisms for veriﬁcation (one of the weaknesses of
the previous peace process). These negotiations were overshadowed by the
doubt (or lack of commitment) by the FARC—EP regarding the possibility of
reaching an agreement and a peace process. The negotiations broke down
after the kidnapping of a former minister by the EPL and his subsequent
death in captivity.
With the arrival of the government of Samper (1994–98), the focus of the
state and the military forces was dispersed by the internal crises of legitimacy
of the presidential ﬁgure within the country. As the president’s campaign
received money from drug traﬃckers to support his presidential bid (El
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Espectador, 2016), Samper lost credibility and legitimacy both inside and
outside the country. The involvement of drug money in ﬁnancing the victory
of Samper added to the prevalent challenge of drug traﬃcking and produc-
tion, and the existence of armed contenders continued to challenge the state’s
monopoly of violence. As a result, the armed forces distrusted the government
because of the role of drug money in his election. This allowed the FARC—
EP and paramilitaries to expand thanks to the resources they accrued from
illicit crops and illicit drugs, and their taxation. Hence there was signiﬁcant
growth of the FARC—EP and the paramilitaries during this period (Duncan,
2006; Pécaut, 2008).
The weakness of the state and the strength of contesting armed groups was
evident in the increase in the extent and intensity of military operations under-
taken by the FARC—EP. The military oﬀensive of the FARC—EP led the
government to abandon several military outposts, which reduced the military
presence in several areas of the country (Palacios, 2012). Hundreds of soldiers
were lost on the battleﬁeld, and hundreds more kidnapped by the FARC—EP.
The strength of paramilitary forces also increased during this period. While
paramilitaries developed an institutional framework in the late 1960s, their
greater encroachment into the Colombian conﬂict was facilitated by Law 356
of 1994, which normalized the possibility of the privatization of security by
diﬀerent actors (which was termed convivir 20) in those areas of the country
where security was precarious.21 This growth of paramilitary activity was
facilitated by existing institutional links between paramilitary forces and
regional élites who shared common goals related to counterinsurgency war-
fare, creating a symbiosis between paramilitary groups and some regional
leaders across the country (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014).
In addition to this process, there was a resurgence of the violent response
by élites to the democratization process of the 1991 Constitution. The
repressive and violent backlash against democratic overtures by actors that do
not want to lose their privileges in a context of violence became a character-
istic feature of the Colombian State, which explains why democratic openings
in Colombia have been frequently been followed by violence and repression
(Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014).
Paramilitaries took advantage of the vulnerability of city-based Colom-
bians, who felt cornered by the guerrillas in the face of the weakness of the
Colombian armed forces. They gained public support and political credibility
beyond the regions where they had inﬂuence through a successful advocacy
and media campaign (Ronderos, 2014). However, by 1997, when the Con-
stitutional Court of Colombia declared the law that rendered the creation of
the convivir organizations unconstitutional, the damage was already done.
Their growth, expansion, and co-optation of local institutions had already
taken place, furthering the entry points for private armed groups formed in
the 1980s into the state apparatus (Romero & Valencia, 2007).
This period (1991–98) also saw a reconﬁguration within armed groups.
After 1997 the diﬀerent paramilitary groups aﬃliated under the Autodefensas
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Unidas de Colombia (AUC)22. Their members (paramilitaries and drug car-
tels) used their private armies as part of their economic and political strate-
gies in diﬀerent parts of the country (Llorente & Deas, 1999). Their aﬃliation
presented a more homogeneous façade and enabled them to communicate a
more coherent discourse beyond their illegal activities.
In this context, the Samper Government decided to negotiate with the
guerrillas to release kidnapped soldiers and police oﬃcers. This was not a
peace process, but a prisoner release/exchange.
In the presidential elections of 1998, the candidate elected by Colombians
was the one who appeared to be the closest to starting a negotiation process
with the FARC—EP. This made the FARC—EP and the debates around their
existence central to Colombian politics, transforming the FARC—EP into a
deciding factor in the next elections.
Elections, war and peace: 1998–2002
President Pastrana was elected with a strong public mandate to achieve peace
with the guerrillas (Pastrana Arango, 2013). A new peace negotiation with
the FARC—EP began in 1999 and ended in 2002. This failed. Contrary to
what might be assumed, this was not related to international political
dynamics and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the USA, but
rather it was determined by the internal dynamics of the process.
From the outset, the peace process was laden with problems regarding the
nature and the structure of the negotiation itself. As the negotiations were
held without a ceaseﬁre, every military action by the guerrillas undermined
the credibility of the process (Corporación Observatorio para la Paz, 2009).
Colombians could not cope with the dissonance of peace conversations while
military actions were taking place.
There were also paradigmatic diﬀerences between the actors at the nego-
tiation table, as well as diﬀerent time frames and logics that clashed. For the
Government, the peace process was conceived in terms of fulﬁlling the man-
date given to Pastrana by Colombians, whereas for the FARC—EP, the peace
process was taken as proof of their strength, evident from their bringing the state
to a negotiation table through sheer force. Both actors sought to achieve peace,
but their logics around peace and envisioned endgames were completely
diﬀerent.
A series of additional elements complicated the negotiations. One of these
was the existence of a demilitarized zone as the size of Switzerland that the
FARC—EP used as a tactical ‘safe haven’. As noted, FARC—EP kidnappings
of civilians, and constant attacks on police stations and military bases across
the country, led many to regard the peace negotiations as dissonant with the
actions of the FARC—EP. During this period the paramilitary forces con-
tinued an aggressive political and military campaign, exploiting the public
sentiment against the FARC—EP (Bonilla, 2012). The campaign depicted the
paramilitaries as defenders of the rule of law and the state, while their
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military actions resulted in massacres and, as the consequence of the clashes
to dislocate the guerrillas from several areas in the country, caused forced
displacement to spike.
The peace process was mired in its preliminary stages. The mere deﬁnition
of a negotiation agenda was troublesome, demonstrating a lack of either
commitment or knowledge of the management of a negotiation process. For
example, in the three years of negotiations the parties failed to establish a
veriﬁcation commission, or determine a friendly third party to solve disputes
in the process (Palacios, 2012).
For many Colombians, these years are remembered as years under siege.
This sense, and the successful media campaign deployed by paramilitaries,
increased the existing public sympathy toward the paramilitaries among some
sectors of the Colombian élites, following the logic that ‘the enemy of my
enemy is my friend’ (Ronderos, 2014). During this period, paramilitaries
managed to inﬂuence and co-opt several political posts across the country,
consolidating their power and encroaching themselves into the Colombian
political system.
This was an unexpected outcome of the 1991 Constitution. The constitu-
tion provided for decentralization in order to allow representation to inform
public policy. However, the co-optation and manipulation of local, regional,
and national politics by power players with weapons and money from drug
traﬃcking was not anticipated (López Hernández & Ávila Martínez, 2010;
Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014).
This peace process came to an end when the FARC—EP hijacked a com-
mercial airplane and kidnapped a member of Congress who was aboard.
However, in spite of the fact that the FARC—EP was seen as an enemy by
society, its inﬂuence on the next electoral campaign remained central. Politi-
cians focused on the ideas of war and peace, and sought ways to appear
supportive of peace but tough on the FARC—EP. Uribe came to power by
giving voice to the frustration of Colombians towards the FARC—EP.
All-out war and peace: 2002–2010
From the beginning of the 2002 presidential campaign, Uribe adopted the
approach of former president López Michelsen of the early 1980s—that the
guerrillas had to be obliged, by force, to negotiate. This was not a new strat-
egy and was reminiscent of the approach undertaken by the administrations
of Turbay, Barco, and Gaviria.
The Uribe Government’s approach to solving the conﬂict diﬀered greatly
from the unpopular peace process of its predecessor. The Uribe Government
became involved in another peace process—not with left-wing forces, but with
the paramilitaries (Pardo Rueda, 2007). This peace process, which was
undertaken between the Colombian Government and the AUC, involved a
demilitarized zone and an ill-deﬁned ceaseﬁre, and managed to garner the
support of the Organization of American States (OAS). The process has been
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widely criticized, however, its implementation created a series of institutions
and structures related to demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration
(DDR), aswell as the ﬁrst modern attempt in Colombia to establish a transitional
justice framework.
The new Government improved several security indicators as a result of the
de-escalation of confrontations with the paramilitaries, and the tactical retreat
by guerrillas to the fringes of the state in response to the latter’s military
oﬀensive. Expressed under Uribe, the capacity of the state to reassert its
military might is partially the legacy of the ‘Plan Colombia’ campaign pursued
by the Pastrana Government.
It is ironic that the improved security indicators in this period were
achieved while the number of internally displaced Colombians skyrocketed
(Ibáñez Londoño, 2011). Security might have improved for some, but not for
all Colombians. By the end of Uribe’s ﬁrst term the failures of the peace
process with the paramilitaries emerged (Pardo Rueda, 2007). In addition,
and thanks to the legal framework that instituted a transitional justice fra-
mework as part of the peace process with the paramilitaries, the denunciation
of the alliances between paramilitaries and politicians started to become visi-
ble. A standing symbol of the reach and the connivance between para-
militaries and a sector of the political establishment in these years is the
standing ovation that the leaders of the paramilitary received in the Colom-
bian capital Bogotá in 2004. At that time, paramilitaries claimed to have
inﬂuence over some 30% of the Colombian Congress (López Hernández &
Ávila Martínez, 2010).
One could argue that, in fact, one of the lessons of the Uribe Government
was the acknowledgment by some sectors of Colombian society of the costs
for human rights and democracy incurred in pursuit of an all-out war strat-
egy. The international community and local organizations began to criticize
the human rights violations taking place within the country as a product of
the military campaign. At the same time, the failures of the peace process
with the paramilitaries became evident. New ‘paramilitary’ groups, now
labelled ‘emergent bands’, appeared in the locations of former paramilitary
groups, recycling their repertoires and capacities almost perfectly. As the
guerrillas retreated, the paramilitaries and their oﬀshoots expanded.
In spite of this, the increased perception of security across the country
enabled Uribe to be easily re-elected for a second term in 2006. He achieved
this after modifying the 1991 Constitution to enable presidential re-election.
However, the extension of his political mandate started to compromise the
separation of powers between the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary
in Colombia, as the 1991 Constitution did not include checks and balances in
the case of re-elections.
Uribe continued his security policy in his second term. The government
facilitated a discourse whereby the members of armed groups were referred to
as terrorists, and Uribe was able to ostracize his political opponents by
labelling them as supporters of terrorist groups (Tickner & Pardo, 2003;
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López de la Roche, 2014). Simultaneously, a nationalist discourse emerged,
and the gloriﬁcation of armed forces was common. Advertisements appeared in
television, radio and printed media, which touted the victories of war and
military operations, and the possibility of winning the war was latent in media
coverage. This world view was bolstered by strategic victories, such as the
killing of the FARC—EP’s military commander and its ‘Chancellor’, as well
as military operations which resulted in the liberation of several people who
had been kidnapped by the FARC—EP. These operations became useful
propaganda instruments for the Government to show its successes. The nationalist,
almost chauvinist, environment made opposition to the government extremely
diﬃcult (López de la Roche, 2014).
The eﬀective propaganda, and the marginalization of opposition, masked
worrying signs. The assassination of civilians, later claimed to be guerrillas or
paramilitaries, by members of the armed forces showed the risks of an all-out
war to institutions: between 2002 and 2008 around 4,000 civilians were mur-
dered by the armed forces and then later presented as guerrillas or para-
militaries (Human Rights Watch, 2015). These events came to be known in
Colombia as the falsos positivos (false positives). The Government put pres-
sure on the military forces to demonstrate results under an incentive system
that equated success with the number of casualties caused to the diﬀerent
illegal groups. The system of rewarding those military units that achieved
higher casualties against the guerrillas or the paramilitaries23 caused some
military units in diﬀerent regions of the country to resort to the assassination
of civilians in the search for rewards and promotions.
In addition to this, accusations of nepotism and corruption came to sur-
round the Uribe Government, which nevertheless attempted to modify the
constitution once again to support Uribe’s serving a third term. The attempt
was aborted by the Colombian Constitutional Court, which ruled that a
second consecutive re-election was against the Colombian Constitution. Still,
a securitization policy and the continuation of the Uribe administration’s
approach proved important for Colombian citizens, since Uribe’s Minister of
Defence, Juan Manuel Santos, was elected as President under the expectation
that he would maintain the approach initiated by Uribe. Once again the
existence of the FARC—EP deﬁned the campaign and the selection of the
incumbent into the Colombian presidency.
The quest for peace: The Colombian state and its history
As seen above, the history of Colombia can be described as a country at odds
with itself. Attempts at reaching peace with diﬀerent armed groups have been
a constant element in the history of the country for the last 70 years. For the
last four decades the state and its institutions have sought to end the conﬂict
in Colombia by either force or negotiation. The multiple peace processes and
formal and attempted negotiations involving diﬀerent guerrillas and para-
military groups across the country are proof of these attempts. Despite
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diﬀerent governments having managed to sign peace agreements with several
organizations, and to demobilize a considerable number of ﬁghters, a great
paradox emerges: peace agreements have not been enough to stop the emer-
gence and continuity of armed organizations within the Colombian state. The
continuation of war and violence in Colombia has been facilitated by the
incentives of illegal drug traﬃcking, the multiplicity of armed actors and
interests in diﬀerent territories, the diﬃculty faced by the state in operating at
the fringes of its territory, and the challenge of consolidating a national
covenant able to incorporate and embrace diﬀerent local elites as part of a
national project.
The Colombian democracy—the longest-running in Latin America—is
belied by many features not typically associated with democracy: more than
7m. citizens becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a result of the
violence, giving it the highest IDP population of any country in the world as
of 2017 (UNHCR, 2017); nearly 1m. assassinations since 1985 (Unidad para
las Victimas, 2017); the death of more than 50,000 combatants; the closure of
political opportunities to political parties not aligned with the liberal or con-
servative élites; the assassination of blossoming political parties; the assassi-
nation of three presidential candidates in a single presidential campaign; and
the stiﬂing of dissent that opposed either radicals, the Government, or local
élites (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014). This is part of the political economy of
Colombia that can be illustrated by its history. Colombia is a case study that
challenges the categories or conceptions of what a democracy is and how it
should operate (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014).
Between 1948 and 2010 the Colombian democracy saw several eﬀorts
undertaken in the search for peace. Diﬀerent Colombian governments have
pursued peace. This quest, as well as the resilience of violence, has prevailed
across time and been illustrated by the failures of previous attempts at peace
with the FARC—EP and other groups. The peace negotiation with the FARC—
EP that started in 2012 can thus be seen as the continuation of the history of
successes and failures of the Colombian state in the search for peace. Its
emergence is the outcome of a process in the making for four decades, which
resulted in a mutually damaging stalemate between the warring parties and
an interest by the élites of both the FARC—EP and the Colombian Govern-
ment in undertaking a negotiation. This created the space and conditions for
the negotiation between the Santos Government, and the FARC—EP
between 2012 and 2016 (see Chapter 3).
Although the FARC—EP is recognized as the biggest armed organization
challenging the power of the state, the demobilization of cadres from the
FARC—EP will not mean that all the violence in Colombia will disappear
overnight. Paramilitary groups, drug traﬃckers, and other armed groups will
present challenges to the success of the 2016 peace agreement and to the
state’s ability to assert its monopoly of force in the country. The peace process
with the FARC—EP has meant that the state has greater ﬂexibility to allocate
its resources against the remaining armed organizations, so it may oblige
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them to submit to the state, or to facilitate a negotiation/surrendering process.
However, this will require the state to establish government functions in those
places where armed groups prevailed in the past, which may prove a challenge
to state capacity. The provision of justice and other public services is necessary
if the state is to take the opportunity to contest these other organizations and
realize its sovereignty.
Notes
1 The author would like to express his gratitude towards Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín
for his help in the development of this chapter. His contributions to previous ver-
sions of this document and his insights for the development of the text were
invaluable.
2 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army.
3 National Liberation Army.
4 Popular Liberation Army.
5 After the peace process with paramilitaries in the early 2000s the Government
proscribed the used of the word paramilitary and started to use the acronym of
BACRIM (criminal organizations) to designate organizations that were formerly
described as paramilitaries.
6 Gaitanist Self-defence Forces of Colombia.
7 In which the former military dictator Rojas Pinilla lost the election to the Con-
servative candidate, Misael Patrana.
8 By means of Decree 3398 of 1965 and Law 48 of 1968.
9 The Uribe agreements should not be confused with the surname of former pre-
sident Uribe (2002–2010). These agreements were signed on 24 March 1984 in the
municipality of La Uribe (Meta province). The agreements provided for a ceaseﬁre,
and a procedure that would allow the transition of the FARC—EP into civilian
life, a series of development initiatives in areas aﬀected by violence, as well as an
oﬃcial statement of commitment from the state to combating paramilitarism.
10 Labour Self Defence Movement.
11 On 24 August 1984 in Corinto (Cauca province) and El Hobo (Huila province), a
ceaseﬁre was signed in order to facilitate the discussion around the reforms that
would help to constitute a future peace process.
12 Patriotic Union.
13 Agreement ratiﬁed by Law 27 of 1980.
14 Quintin Lame Armed Movement.
15 Revolutionary Workers’ Party of Colombia.
16 Socialist Renovation Stream. This was a faction of the ELN which considered that
the armed struggle was no longer viable and opted for political contestation versus
the state.
17 Some argue, however, that before this time, the left- wing guerrillas were not
actually dependent on ﬁnancial or logistical support from the USSR.
18 A sub-group of the ELN and a dissident faction from the demobilized EPL also
took part in this campaign.
19 This included several massacres, such as those that took place in Filipinas, Las
Moras, San Rafael, La Lolita and La Chinita.
20 Coexistence or cohabitation, in English.
21 During this period at least 529 rural cooperatives were created in 24 provinces
within the country, which involved at least 15,300 citizens (Verdad Abierta, 2013).
22 The United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia was a ‘federal’ organization of right-
wing groups that in some cases included landlords, industrialists and cattle farmers
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looking to defend themselves from the guerrillas; in other cases it involved groups
operating at the borders of legality, such as the emerald miners and traders, and in
other cases it involved drug traﬃckers, and right-wing armed groups—the legacy
of the big cartels of the 1980s.
23 There are other examples on how these ‘body-count’ indicators created perverse
incentives. Notable examples are the assassination of civilians in the Vietnam War
(Daddis, 2011), and more recently the use of these indicators in the war against
drug cartels in Mexico (Ahmed & Schmitt, 2016).
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